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Abstract

This essay is a response to John Kennedy's defense of Johnson Controls, Inc.'s fetal protection policy which
was struck down last year in International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc. A unanimous Supreme
Court held in the case that the policy, which excluded women from a "fetotoxic" workplace, violated the
federal employment discrimination laws. The Court's decision was issued only a day before Kennedy was
scheduled to debate the issue of whether Title VII bars fetal protection policies with Professor Elinor
Schroeder at the Kansas Journal's first symposium on March 21-22. 1991. The Court's decision rendered the
technical statutory issues that might otherwise have been discussed at the symposium essentially moot and
freed Kennedy to address, at least in part, some of the more interesting philosophical questions that the
notion of fetal protection suggests. Although to some extent this essay reacts to Kennedy's article previously
published in this Journal, it results more directly from and responds more explicitly to his oral defense of fetal
protection policies generally, and the language in which that defense was couched.
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"[T]he way people talk ... is of significance, ... the language
they use and the connections they make reveal the world that they
see and in which they act."l
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Patriarchy, Paternalism,
and the Masks
of "Fetal Protection"
Kim Dayton
Patriarchy is the power of the fathers: a familialsocial, ideological, political system in which menby force, direct pressure, or through ritual, tradition,
law and language, customs, etiquette, education, and
the division of labor, determine what part women
shall or shall not play, and in which the female is
everywhere subsumed under the male. 2
This essay is a response to John Kennedy's defense of
Johnson Controls, Inco's fetal protection policy which was
struck down last year in Imernational Union, UA W v. Johnson
COlllro/s. Inc. 3 A unanimous Supreme Court held in the case
that the policy. which excluded women from a "fetotoxic"
workplace. violated the federal employment discrimination
laws. The Court's decision was issued only a day before
Kennedy was scheduled to debate the issue of whether Title
VII bars fetal protection policies with Professor Elinor
Schroeder at the Kansas Journal's first symposium on March
21-22. 1991. The Court's decision renaered the technical
statutory issues that might otherwise have been discussed at
the symposium essentially moot and freed Kennedy to
address. at least in part, some of the more interesting
philosophical questions that the notion of fetal protection
suggests. Although to some extent this essay reacts to

Kennedy's article previously published in this Journal;~ it
results more directly from and responds more explicitly to his
oral defense of fetal protection policies generally, and the
language in which that defense was couched.
I am actually somewhat reluctant even to use the term
"fetal protection" in this essay. In many ways, the use of such
words, at least to describe the mandatory policy invalidated in
Johnson Controls, is but one example of the manner in which
the patriarchal socio-Iegal structure has successfully
manipulated language to validate such policies-and their
historical antecedents-despite their patent discriminatory
effects on women. For the most part, these policies do not
protect fetuses. Rather, the policies exclude women from
certain workplaces because they are deemed capable of
bearing children. As I discuss below, these policies generally
apply to the extremely broad category of all women "of
childbearing age" whether or not an individual woman within
that category intends to or is likely to carry a fetus while
working in the toxic environment. The term "fetal protection"
is thus inaccurate; yet it allows advocates of such policies to
frame the debate surrounding the underlying issues in terms of
a conflict between a mother and her fetus. The implicit
Kim Dayton is a Professor of Law at the University of Kansas.
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Johnson Controls' hiring personnel were instructed to tell women that :
the company had no openings for women capable of bearing children. !
connotation these two words carry is that a fetus is a person
needing protection from something-from its mother, as it
turns out. Though I do not accept the term as accurately
describing the true nature of these policies, I yield to custom
to facilitate my discussion.
Although I do not intend to focus exclusively in this essay
on the specific policy at issue in Johnson Controls, some
background on it will provide a context for the broader
discussion. Johnson Controls' "fetal protection" policy was in
almost all respects typical. The policy precluded all "fertile"
women from working in any area of the plant determined to
be "fetotoxic." Fertile women, as defined by the policy, were
all women between the ages of five and sixty-three who could
not prove that they were infertile. In other words, the policy
presumed a woman's, or girl's, capacity to and interest in
bearing children. In practice, this meant that if a woman fell
within the prescribed age range, she had to show that she had
been surgically sterilized. s The policy defined a "fetotoxic"
environment as one that, in the estimation of the company's
medical advisors, created a likelihood of injury to a fetus
carried in the womb. How likely that injury must be,
however, was not clear. Interestingly, the environments
within the plant determined to be fetotoxic were the ones
where most of the company's highest paying blue collar jobs
were located~ Moreover, the effect of the policy was to
exclude women from all industrial jobs at Johnson Controls
because the policy barred women not just from fetotoxic
environments per se, but from "any job that might lead to a
promotion to" a job in a fetotoxic environment. 6 Indeed,
Johnson Controls' hiring personnel were instructed to tell
women that the company had no openings for women capable
of bearing children.7
The effect of Johnson Controls' policy on its female
employees was real and immediate. One of the named
plaintiffs in the case was an employee who underwent
"voluntary" sterilization for economic reasons; she simply
could not afford to give up the income associated with the
high-paying jobs from which she would otherwise be
excluded.s The policy excluded from the fetotoxic workplace
women whose husbands were sterile, those using effective
methods of birth control, lesbians, and women who did not
wish to undergo major surgery to preserve their right to
work. 9 It also forced women who wished to remain in the
higher paying jobs encompassed by the policy publicly to
identify themselves as sterile.

In defending this policy of exclusion, Kennedy raised a
number of points that seemed extraordinary to me at the time
and became even more so as I began to learn more about fetal
protection policies and their history. Among other things,
Kennedy said that Johnson Controls adopted the mandatory
policy because women did not respond to a voluntary policy
which the company had in place from 1977 to 1982. He said
that in situations involving "conflicts" between maternal
rights and fetal rights, women are simply incapable of
understanding the difficult medical and bioethical issues
raised by fetotoxic environments; or, alternatively, that fertile
women will be motivated by short-term economic
considerations (rather, presumably, than by the interests of
their unborn children) when deciding whether to work in such
an environment. Finally, he said that the policy was adopted
on the advice of the company's doctors, not its lawyers-as
though the involvement of the medical profession a fortiori
eliminated any possibility of covert discrimination or gender
bias in the formation and implementation of the policy.I O
Though many other aspects of Kennedy's argument are
problematic, it is the above-mentioned claims that I will
address. For purposes of my discussion, I will assume that ill
utero lead exposure at the levels involved in the Johnson
Controls case poses a significant risk to fetuses that does not
exist for adults exposed to the same environmental lead levels.
First, consider Kennedy's assertion that women did not
respond to the company's voluntary policy. In support of this
claim, he said that "a substantial number" of women became
pregnant while working in the fetotoxic environment (eight,
actually), and that one of them had a child who demonstrated
some characteristics associated with prenatal lead exposure. I I
At the most pragmatic level, though, the facts belie the claim
!hat these eight "bad" women to whom Kennedy alludes were
even in a position to make a rational decision with respect to
the voluntary policy. Contrary to what Kennedy would like
us to think, women working at Johnson Controls were not
privy to the information, statistics, and medical opinion
concerning prenatal lead exposure that the company provided
to the Supreme Court of the United States when it was forced
to justify its policy under Title VIT. As Professor Schroeder
has so aptly demonstrated,12 the language of the policy was'
hardly designed to encourage women to remove themselves
from a high-paying, though fetotoxic, working environment
because of pregnancy. Johnson Controls' voluntary policy,
quite simply, did not contain the kind of information a woman

The Kansas Journal of Law & Public Policy

HeinOnline -- 2 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 26 1992-1993

Masks of "Fetal Protection"

would need to make a fully informed choice about the risks
involved. The policy did not merely minimize the potential
risks of fetal exposure to high levels of lead in the
workplace-it implicitly denied that serious risks to fetuses
existed at Johnson Controls. It characterized the principal risk
of excessive lead exposure during pregnancy as being
miscarriage and claimed that the relationship between lead
exposure and risk to the fetus was less than that of smoking
and cancer.B
Thus, the evidence of the eight bad women is all but
irrelevant to the question of whether well-informed women
would respond to a voluntary policy. In fact, there is a great
deal of sociological evidence that women who are fully
informed of the risks that particular kinds
of conduct pose to fetuses they intend to
carry to term, and who have a choice to
eliminate those risks, do not engage in the
problematic conduct. 14 Most of us know
anecdotally what empirical studies have
demonstrated: pregnant women are more
likely to moderate their behavior to protect
a fetus than to protect themselves.l 5
Moreover, one could just as easily cite the
dozens or hundreds of women who
worked in the fetotoxic environment !
during the voluntary policy's tenure and
did not have children as evidence that in
fact most women did respond to the
voluntary policy in the manner that
Kennedy believes they should have
responded. That eight women did not
respond "appropriately" (the eight who
had children) surely cannot justify
penalizing all women-whether or not they planned to have
children-in the sweeping manner envisioned by the
mandatory policy ultimately adopted by Johnson Controls.
Kennedy's argument concerning the need for a mandatory
policy is related to his second argument: that women are
incapable of evaluating the evidence, balancing the risks and
benetits of working in the fetotoxic environment, and making
the proper choice to protect the fetus. Obviously, all women
confronted with the policy did respond to it. It is just that
some of them did not respond in the manner which Kennedy
deemed appropriate. In arguing that the voluntary policy
obviously failed because eight women conceived despite the
dangers of lead exposure to their fetuses, Kennedy implicitly
suggested that any rational woman would choose to take a pay
cut rather than endanger a fetus. It is certainly not clear that
the alleged conflict between possibly endangering a fetus and,
for example. failing to meet the economic needs of existing
children, must be resolved in favor of the fetus. I wiII turn to

this premise in a moment. But consider first the seemingly
innocuous claim that a voluntary policy could not be expected
to be successful because women are not in a position to make
"the difficult toxicological choice[s]" involved in such a
decision. This paternalistic claim masks, among other things,
an implicit assumption that women essentially are not capable
of deciding complex questions in any reasoned way.
The notion that women lack the intellectual resources to
make "rational" decisions in any sphere, is, of course, older
than history. And it has been espoused overtly more recently
than one might expect, particularly in connection with matters
of family and work. The Victorian concept of "separate
spheres" regarded women as intellectually inferior but
morally superior to men. 16 During the
nineteenth century, the American Medical
Association (AMA) mobilized public
I support for criminalizing abortion by
contending that women who had abortions
simply did not, and could not, understand
what they were doing.J7 Opponents of
women's suffrage in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries argued that
women lacked the capacity to make
reasoned judgments concerning the
political process and hence should not be
permitted to vote.l 8 This belief in women's
limited intellectual capacity is,
unfortunately, still popular in some circles.
Even today, one theme of the right to life
movement is that women who have
abortions do not understand that they are
killing their babies. 19
Admittedly, Kennedy did not ever say
explicitly that women are intellectually inferior to men. In
arguing that a mandatory policy was necessary, Kennedy
spoke in terms of "employees," not "women.''20 His claim,
however, that a mandatory policy was necessary to protect
them and the unborn from the consequences of their own
foolishness may well have been the product of such an
unconscious belief. In fact, fetal protection policies are just
one facet of the tradition of "protectionist" legislation which
developed from such premises. 21 It requires no great
interpretive leaps to see this belief in women's irrationality in
Kennedy's defense of Johnson Controls' actions. Injustifying
a mandatory policy on the ground of women's inability to
make rational choices on their own, Kennedy revealed,
perhaps unwittingly, the continued influence of such views
upon the formation of corporate and public policy.
Suppose, however, that my interpretation of Kennedy's
language is too radical. One need not concede my point here
to find troublesome value judgments implicit in Johnson

Obviously, all
women confronted
with the policy did
respond to it. It is
just that some of i
them did not respond:
in the manner which
Kennedy deemed
appropriate.
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The theoretical woman who is fully informed of the dangers of lead
exposure to a fetus, yet chooses to stay on in a fetotoxic environment,
may well be motivated not by disregard for the fetus, but by concern
for existing children or other family obligations.
Controls' effort to exclude all women from the fetotoxic
environment. According to Kennedy, a mandatory policy of
exclusion was necessary to ensure that women made the
rational and correct decision to sacrifice present income to
protect future children from some unquantified risk of
childhood developmental problems. 22 This assessment, of
course, works only if one concludes that in fact this is the only
rational or defensible choice for a person confronted with
these two alternatives. Yet Kennedy did not feel the need to
explain why this choice was obvious-much less why
employers are justified as a moral matter in giving women
only those two alternatives.
As I have suggested previously, deciding between the
needs of the fetus and the needs of the individual and her
family is not as simple as Kennedy would have us believe.
The theoretical woman who is informed fully of the dangers
of lead exposure to a fetus, yet chooses to stay on in a
fetotoxic environment, may well be motivated not by
disregard for the fetus, but by concern for existing children or
other family obligations.23 Though Kennedy would like to
cast such a woman's decision to stay as morally bankrupt, I
would argue that it is the policymaker who forces her to make
that decision whose values and judgments should be
questioned.
By framing the fetal protection issue as one of conflicting
rightS-between the mother and the fetus-advocates of the
concept of fetal protection successfully have created an
analytical framework that invites a resolution of the alleged
conflict in favor of fetal protection, even if that means
denying the mother job opportunities or even her freedom.24
The conflict seems more difficult to resolve in the mother's
favor than the "conflict" raised by the abortion issue: one
need not be "pro-life" with respect to the question of abortion
to agree that a woman ought to take measures to protect the
integrity of a fetus she intends to carry to term. Indeed, when
I first began to consider the problem of "maternal rights
versus fetal rights," I had little difficulty rationalizing the
concept of true fetal protection. 25 I consider myself a
humanitarian, and it is intuitively difficult to justify social
policy that permits one person to jeopardize the lifelong wellbeing of another for the sake of, as Kennedy put it, "short-

EI

I

term economic needs."
One problem with this mode of reasoning, however, is that
the architects of fetal protection policies imply that there is
but a single solution to this conflict. That solution, to exclude
the woman from the workplace, depends on denying
completely the woman her rights in order to protect the needs
of the fetus. But this is not the only way in which the alleged
conflict can be resolved. In fact, it is not the way the conflict
has been resolved in any but a small group of workplace
scenarios. As a number of feminist scholars have observed,
fetal protection policies exist only in industries where women
might be deemed "expendable"-that is, in industries either
where women do not make up a significant portion of the
workforce, or from which, historically, they have been
excluded because of overt gender discrimination. Many,
perhaps even most, workplace environments that employ
women on a large scale create risks of harm to the fetus that
are at least as serious as, for example, lead exposure at the
levels involved at Johnson Controls. 26 Nevertheless, fetal
protection policies do not exist in such industries because they
could not function without women; society's concern for a
smoothly running economy evidently outweighs its concern
for the millions of young lives potentially affected by these
workplace hazards. When viewed against this backdrop, fetal
protection policies seem to be less about fetal protection and
more about keeping historically male-dominated workplaces
male dominated.
Equally important, where conflicts between paternal and
fetal rights arise, they have inevitably been resolved in favor
of paternal rights. A typical response to this observation is
that the connection between male exposure to environmental
toxins (or of male ingestion of cocaine, or a father's smoking)
and fetal damage is "less clear" or "less well-established" than
that between maternal exposure and fetal damage. Even
assuming that this is true with respect to many kinds of
workplace hazards (an assumption that is becoming
increasingly suspect),27 the fact is that there do not appear to
be any examples of fetal protection policies aimed at or which
operate to exclude men. Men simply are not precluded from
working in environments that, for example, threaten the
integrity of their sperm, and hence of the children that they
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might someday father. In other words, employers, and
ultimately society, are concerned about fetal protection only
when the rights being subordinated to the fetus's are those of
the mother.
Kennedy's emphasis on the company medical department's
role in formulating its fetal protection policy is interesting.
His declaration that the mandatory policy imposed in 1982
was adopted "at the urging of the company's doctors, not the
company lawyers"28 appears intended to assure us that the
policy was a reflection not of corporate greed or intentional
sex discrimination, but of pure humanitarian concern.
Unfortunately, this argument loses its allure when we are
reminded that the male-dominated medical
profession has never been particularly
concerned with the interests and needs of
women. The AMA's involvement in the
nineteenth century anti-abortion movement
is exemplary of the profession's role in the
debate over women's rights versus the
interests of family, children, and society.
Feminists have repeatedly documented the
health care industry'S "brutal indifference
toward women. "29 In recent years, we
have learned that medical researchers
almost universally have excluded women '
as subjects in their research, and that they
have failed to devote the same attention to
diseases that affect primarily women as to
those which affect primarily men.
Recently, a number of hospitals have gone
to court to protect the "rights" of a fetus
vis-a-vis its mother, almost inevitably taking legal positions
that call for complete subordination of the mothers' interests
to those of the fetus.3 o Indeed, some physicians have gone so
far as to encourage and assist in the criminal prosecution of
women whose conduct is perceived to endanger their unborn
children.
The fact that Kennedy did not know this misogynic side of
the medical profession-that he is able to use the medical
argument at all-is indicative of the impoverished
understanding that policymakers generally have of women's
historic oppression. It is extremely unlikely that the medical
"advisors" \vho ostensibly recommended this policy were at
all concerned with the needs and interests of women. In view
of this, their recommendations concerning corporate policy
formation are arguably implicitly suspect. It is more
important to me that Kennedy explain why the company's

medical personnel did not recommend making the workplace
safe for fetuses than simply to know that Johnson Controls'
policy was the product of medical, rather than legal, opinion.
In criticizing Kennedy's paternalism, am I suggesting that we
should not seek solutions to the reality that maternal exposure
to environmental toxins may threaten the future health and
development of an unborn fetus? Of course not. Yet, from
the perspective of many feminists, the solution to this problem
is really quite simple. Construct the job ~nd the workplace as
though women matter. Consider the issue in light of its
historical context. Reject the view that the fetotoxic
workplace raises a problem of conflicting "rights," and
conceive of the problem as one of the
limits of responsibility-including the
limits of employer responsibility to the
fetus that it ostensibly views as so
important. Such an approach assuredly
implies that an employer should not
remove all potential mothers from the
workplace, but rather, should make the
workplace safe for the potential fetus.
Kennedy appears to contend that this was
not possible at Johnson Controls, but the
fact is that any workplace can always be
made safer, and usually safe enough for a
fetus. The problem is that the cost of
taking measures to ensure such safety may
be more than the employer would like to
pay. It is far easier-and historically it has
been perfectly acceptable-to allow
women to bear the economic costs of
societal ills than to allocate that cost more equally among all
members of society.
As I began to appreciate the historical and sociological
underpinnings of fetal protection policies, in all their guises, it
became clear to me that these policies cannot be understood
simply as a neutral solution to a thorny conflict between
maternal and fetal rights. They are, instead, yet another
reflection of an historic pattern that has denied women the
right to work in particular employment contexts. Masked in
language that conceals this history, fetal protection policies
are intuitively justifiable and hence appear just. If society is
truly concerned about the rights of fetuses as persons or future
persons, it must be willing to devise social and economic
policies that will ensure that protection of those rights does
not come exclusively at the expense of the women who carry
them.

[E]mployers, and
ultimately society,
are concerned about
fetal protection only
when the rights
being subordinated
to the fetus's are
those of the mother.
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of new scientific evidence which demonstrated beyond a
shadow of a doubt that the embryo was a child from
conception onward.).
[d.; See gellerally id. at 20-341.
18. See, e.g., AILEEN S. KRADITOR. THE IDEAS OF THE WOMAN
SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT. 1890-1920, at 14-42 (1965); Catherine A.
MacKinnon. Reflectiolls Oil Sex Equality Under Law. 100 YALE LJ.
1281. 1283 n.12 (1991); Robert J. Steinfeld, Property and SUffrage in
the Early American Republic, 41 STAN. L. REv. 335, 357 (1989); see
also Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) ("[T]he civil law,
as well as nature herself. has always recognized a wide difference in
the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man is, or
should be woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper

timidity and delicacy of the female sex evidently unfits it for many of
the occupations of civil life.").
19. This is the premise of the notorious anti-abortion film "The
Silent Scream."
20. Kennedy, supra note 4, at 141 ("The employee is the least
informed and the least capable of making a difficult toxicological
choice .... Furthermore, the employee's decision may be influenced
by short-term economic needs.") (emphasis added).
21. See generally Becker, supra note 4, at 1221-25 (discussing
history of protective legislation affecting women's right to work);
Ellen Bigge, Comment, The Fetal Rights Colltroversy: A
ReSUrfacing of Sex Discrimination in the Guise of Fetal Protection,
57 UMKC L. REv. 261 (1989).
22. According to Johnson Controls' voluntary policy, the principal
risk of prenatal lead exposure is miscarriage. It would seem that
perhaps Kennedy is just as concerned about this risk to fetuses as the
developmental problems that are thought to occur in some children
exposed to lead in utero. Emphasizing this aspect of prenatal lead
exposure, however, has certain pro-life moral overtones. Overtones
that Kennedy no doubt did not have an interest in discussing as a
justification for Johnson Controls' fetal protection pOlicy.
23. See UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 902 (7th
Cir. 1989 (en banc) (Cudahy, 1., dissenting), rev'd III S. Ct. 1196
(1991). ("What is the situation of the pregnant woman, unemployed
or working for the minimum wage and unprotected by health
insurance, in relation to her pregnant sister, exposed to an
indeterminate lead risk but well-fed, housed and doctored? Whose
fetus is at greater risk? Whose decision is this to make?") (emphasis
added).
24. Cj. Note, Rethinking (M}otherhood: Feminist Theory and
State Regulation of Pregnancy, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1325, 1335
(1990) ("Rights discourse transforms problems in a way that makes
them subject to legal solution . . . . some feminists have suggested
that the language of rights is problematic in that it inadequately
describes women's experience while masking issues of power.").
25. Cj. Becker, supra note 4, at 1220 ("At first glance, most
people presented with this issue (myself included) assume that
'reasonable' restrictions on maternal employment must be
appropriate in some circumstances for the protection of fetuses.").
By true fetal protection, I am thinking of protective measures
narrowly designed to protect an actual fetus who can be expected to
be carried to term. Johnson Controls' policy, as noted, went far
beyond this in its exclusion of all women from the workplace,
irrespective of whether they were or intended to become pregnant.
Most fetal protection policies are overbroad in this sense, and thus
misnamed. In another sense, of course, fetal protection measures are
seldom broad enough, in that they never evolve in environments in
which women are deemed indispensable.
26. See Schroeder, supra note 4, at 147; Becker, supra note 4, at
1237-40 (list examples of other "fetotoxic" workplaces). It is worth
mentioning that in 1981 the EEOC withdrew a proposed fetal
protection guideline after it was determined that over 20 million
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women worked in jobs that posed risks to fetuses. See Interpretive
Guidelines on Employment Discrimination and Reproductive
Hazards, 45 Fed. Reg. 7514 (1980) (to be codified at 41 C.F.R. 6020) (proposed Feb. I, 1980) (articulating guideline); Interpretive
Guidelines on Employment Discrimination and Reproductive
Hazards; Withdrawel of Proposed Guidelines 46 Fed. Reg. 3916
(1981) (proposed Jan. 16, 1981) (withdrawing guideline).
27. Until relatively recently, it was not particularly fashionable to
research the relationship between male conduct and fetal damage.
Recently, however, it has become clear through a number of studies
that many kinds of paternal conduct can have tetragenic effects on
offspring. See generally Mary C. Lowry, et aI., Male-Mediated
Behavioral Abnormalities, MurATION REsEARCH, Apr. 1990, at 21329; David A. Savitz, et aI., Influence of Paternal Age, Smoking, and
Alcohol Consumption on Congential Abnormalities, TETRALOGY,
Oct. 1991, at 429-40; Ricardo A. Yazigi, et aI., Demonstration of
Specific Binding of Cocaine to Human Spermatozoa, 266 JAMA
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1956 Oct. 9, 1991; Vitamin C Deficiency in a Man's Diet Might
Cause Problems for Offspring, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1992, at C12
(study reported in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
showed direct relationship between a male's diet low in Vitamin C
and increased DNA damage in sperm cells); Dwight E.M. Angell,
Sperm Damage Linked to Birth Defects, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE,
Dec. 31, 1991, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Medline File.; Protecting
Unborn, USA TODAY, Dec. 17, 1991, at 4D; Jane Brody, Personal
Health, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1991, at 64. In fact, the record in
Johnson Controls itself indicates that lead exposure at the levels
involved in the case may have tetragenic effects on sperm. 886 F.2d
918-19 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting), rev'd
III S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
28. Kennedy, supra note 4, at 142.
29. RICH, supra note 2, at x.
30. See generally Cole, supra note 14, at 2664.
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